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BT-VAP - Overview
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• Blue Team Vulnerability Assessment Program (BT-VAP) Defined:
An evaluation to ascertain the operational security posture of an 
agency’s critical systems/networks; focusing on the IT assets &
supporting infrastructures that enable the mission to operate
• Blue Team refers to the tactics and techniques employed: a blue 
team is done in full coordination with the mission elements being 
assessed in a transparent manner with no impact to mission ops
• As BT-VAP evaluates missions “end-to-end”; it is often perceived 
(incorrectly) as duplicative of other assessment type activities:
BT-VAP - Team
• Need for a Blue Team to comprehensively evaluate CS-IA factors in 
a methodical manner results in needing Subject Matter Expertise 
across multiple areas to focus on this specific evaluation
• Use of a “risk jury” with SMEs from multiple disciplines with varying 
perspectives to provide a comprehensive “360o” assessment view 
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Five Key Role Specialists on this BT-VAP Risk Jury:
We evaluate an organization “top to bottom” (from policy/plans  to operational 
posture)  to examine IF and HOW they address CS-IA risk factors to determine what
their operational security posture is compared to other similar environments 
CS-IA = Cybersecurity - Information Assurance
BT-VAP - Testing 
Capabilities
 Cybersecurity Evaluation: determine critical assets, model the “mission thread” 
that these critical assets use to enable the mission – then do a selective “deep 
dive” on potential points of vulnerability based on a test plan &  approved rules of 
engagement to cover:
• Space/Mission Systems (ground)
• Industrial Control Systems/SCADA
• Supporting Infrastructure:  (Layer-2/Layer-3 Network Devices, Controlled 
Interfaces/Firewalls, Cybersecurity Defense (CND) mechanisms, etc)
 Software Security Evaluation:  analyze the software code base which supports 
critical assets and mission threads
• Source Code Analysis 
• Binary/Compiled Code Analysis (S/W Origin Analysis)
 BT-VAP Testing Techniques involve a combination of three principal methods:
• Analytic/Tabletop Analysis
• In the Lab Testing (modeling-simulation environment)
• On-Site with a “flyaway” team with mobile assets 
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We evaluate an organization to examine IF and HOW they address CS-IA risk factors to 
determine what your operational security posture is compared to other similar environments 
CS-IA = Cybersecurity - Information Assurance
BT-VAP - Process
 Risk Assessment of Missions (from an “outsiders” perspective)
 Threat & Scope Analysis (TSA) produced using only publically available information
 Site Survey to Finalize Assessment Scope & Perform Data Collection Activities
 Test Planning Phase
 Rules of Engagement (RoE) & Test Plan for selected mission threads 
 Network Topology modeled (inc. routers, firewalls, & subnets)
 Host Vulnerability Data overlaid with Network Model 
 Mission Threads with supporting infrastructure (inc. DNS, LDAP, SCADA, etc.)
 Active Assessment Phase
 Fly-Away team travels on-site to conduct “on-site” testing 
 Analysis & Reporting
 Document detailed evaluation findings; Provide outbrief and final report
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Blue Team VAP coordinates and collaborates with the elements being assessed in order to 
identify, analyze and evaluate the security risks to critical systems which increasingly rely on 
a diverse set of IT assets, without disrupting mission operations.
BT-VAP Activities
 Scope the Assessment 
 Collect network based configurations (layer 2/3) 
 Build out network topology in modeling tool
 Collect vulnerability credentialed scans on assets
 Perform binary analysis on custom mission software
 Perform source code analysis of custom mission 
software
 Ingest host-based scan data and results of code 
analysis into model
 Perform detailed path analysis on critical data flows
 Conduct in-depth interviews and analysis
 Identify all access points into the networks
 Validate critical findings
 Demonstrate potential exploitation scenarios 
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Fig. 1: Basic Network Topology
Fig. 2: Identification of Exposure
Fig. 3: Potential Exploitation Paths
*
*
* Unique virtualization approach deployed to limit 
impact during assessment. Create virtual “snapshots” 
of critical assets to perform testing against.
*
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Demonstrates that a pathway exists from the VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or Untrusted to a vulnerable piece of software
Vulnerable SW
VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or 
“Untrusted”
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates all outbound access paths (Pivoting) from the vulnerable asset
Vulnerable SW
Sample Exposure
10Demonstrates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited from this server
Vulnerable Asset
“Pivot Point”
Mission Control that 
“wasn’t” network 
accessible from VPN, 
Untrusted, Etc.
Attack Depth = 1
Lessons Learned: Space 
Mission Systems 
• Tend to be quite different from enterprise (business) systems 
 Tend to include a lot of custom code/customized solutions that are 
not found in very many places
 Difficult to modify/patch – unless designed/engineered carefully can 
be difficult to evaluate  (test strings do not always represent the 
operational environment)
 Older systems were not designed/engineered to function in a 
contested, high threat environment (i.e. the Internet)
 Frequent Lack of Knowledge on exactly what it takes to operate 
existing systems (ports, protocols, settings)
 Most space/mission ground systems lack situational awareness 
capabilities to monitor functionality/performance/security
 Limited attention paid to the security testing of mission software
 Designed to be a stovepipe – when joined to other multi-mission 
environments and moved to an IP enabled architecture, the  threats 
and the attack surface they are exposed to grows exponentially 
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Lessons Learned: 
Summary
• Some assets are more critical than others
• Some vulnerabilities are more critical than others
• Different methods of evaluation will yield different results
• The state of A&A documentation does not always match the 
security posture of the asset
• Most service providers are not fully aware of the traffic on their 
network; thus detecting what is not “normal” via security 
monitoring is difficult
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BT-VAP Deliverables
• Network Topology Model (routers, firewalls, & subnets)
– Provides the “ground truth” of network architecture  
– Allows near-real time analysis of network access/exposure
• Host vulnerability data overlaid with Network Model 
– Provides ability to analyze the overall security posture of each 
mission should vulnerable components become compromised
• Mission Threads
– Depicts the components required to perform the critical 
functions of each mission in a set of diagrams
• Inc. Routers, Firewalls, Servers, supporting assets, etc.
• Final Report: detailing results, analysis and prioritized set 
of recommendations 
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BT-VAP Debrief at the conclusion of the active assessment will include preliminary 
results, analysis and recommendations  to enable stakeholders to make more informed 
decisions on balancing risks to the security posture of missions evaluated
BACKUP SLIDES
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Emerging Threats…
 Emergence of Cybersecurity has increased the focus on security risks to Information 
Technology (IT) assets – going beyond “traditional” Information Assurance (IA) concerns:
• More sophisticated threats have emerged from increasing sources as advanced “hacker” 
tools and techniques have emerged and proliferated to broaden the “attack surface” 
available across globally interconnected networks 
 As systems and infrastructures become increasingly interconnected the IT security posture of 
the linkages between networks, systems and supporting infrastructures has become 
increasingly difficult to understand, to provide, and to evaluate which requires: 
• Mission Understanding:  how mission functions are being performed on an “end-to-end” 
basis and their supporting IT base in order to identify critical assets (e.g. “crown jewels”) 
• Information Technology/Information Assurance: how to apply security principles to IT 
assets in order to provide Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
• Ability to evaluate Software security: is critical as modern system capabilities are 
increasingly shaped & implemented by software components – as this testing is an 
emerging discipline - detecting flaws at random intervals occurs frequently in most 
software code packages
• Address Industrial Control Systems (ICS): an increasing target of choice for many threats 
as most of these systems are not designed to operate in a high threat environment
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Cred vs Non Cred Scans
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Example SW Impacting 
Mission
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This example will depict how unsecure software within a 
network can potentially impact critical mission assets
Developers can’t assume protection from Firewall. Need 
“Defense in Depth”. Can’t assume if knocking on door, 
that they are supposed to be there.
Open Source Scanning
Vulnerability Affected File Mitigation
CVE-2006-1546: Allows remote attackers to read or write data
belonging to a signed applet.
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade Jar file to 1.2.9 or newer
CVE-2006-1547: Allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service via a multipart/form-data encoded
XXXXXX.jar N/A (new versions exist but also contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2013-4002: Allows remote attackers to affect availability via
unknown vectors.
XXXXXX.jar N/A (new versions exist but also contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2013-4002: Allows remote attackers to affect availability via
unknown vectors.
XXXXXX.jar N/A (new versions exist but also contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2014-0107: Allows remote attackers to bypass expected
restrictions and load arbitrary classes or access external
resources via a crafted messages
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer
CVE-2014-0114: Allows remote attackers to "manipulate" the
ClassLoader and execute arbitrary code via the class parameter
XXXXXX.jar N/A (new versions exist but also contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2015-0254: Allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code or conduct external XML entity (XXE) attacks
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer
CVE-2003-1516: Allows remote attackers to read or write data
belonging to a signed applet.
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer
CVE-2007-4575: Allows user-assisted remote attackers to
execute arbitrary Java code via crafted database documents
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade to Jar file 1.8.0.10 or newer
CVE-2010-2227: Allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service (application outage) or obtain sensitive information via a
crafted header
XXXXXX.jar N/A (new versions exist but also contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2011-2894: Allows remote attackers to bypass intended
security restrictions and execute untrusted code
XXXXXX.jar Upgrade to Jar file 3.0.6. or newer
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Source Code Analysis
SCA Tool’s Default Security Categorization
Critical
XXXXXX
High
SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Programming Errors
Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 078
XXXXXX
Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 079
Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 089
Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 601
Porous Defenses - CWE ID 798
Risky Resource Management - CWE ID 022
Porous Defenses - CWE ID 807
Porous Defenses - CWE ID 863
OWASP Top 10 2013
A1 Injection
XXXXXX
A2 Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 Insecure Direct Object References
A5 Security Misconfiguration
A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
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Detailed Path Analysis
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Shows all 
devices on 
critical path
Access to Critical 
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Threats to Critical 
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Direct exposure is vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited directly from “untrusted” address 
space
Indirect exposure is vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited from “untrusted” address space via 
leapfrog (pivot) through a different trusted 
source
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Analysis Example
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Host #1 Med No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #2 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #3 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #4 Low No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #5 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #6 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No No Yes
Host #7 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #8 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Host #9 Low No Yes N/A No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No No Yes
Host #10 Low No Yes No No No N/A N/A No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Consolidate results/analysis into graphical stoplight chart depicting each critical 
assets security posture to include network exposure
Back
